36.1 TIMING:
36.11 TIMING: Mobilization represents the conversion of civilian factories to military production and has the economic and military effects set out below in each turn in which mobilization occurs. Mobilization increments are triggered for each major power in the following turns.
B. ITALY: Fall 1939.
C. JAPAN: Fall 1939, and three additional mobilizations thereafter at the option of the Japanese player:
EXAMPLE: USJT reach 10 during the Allied Fall 1940 player turn. If Japan has not already triggered its second mobilization, it must do so during the Fall 1940 game turn. Japanese air units mobilized in Fall 1940 may be constructed in the Japanese Fall 1941 unit construction phase.
D. RUSSIA: Russia mobilizes as follows:

Until war breaks out between Russian and Germany, the first two Russian mobilizations take two turns to complete. After those mobilizations are completed, or possibly sooner if war breaks out between Russian and Germany, each Russian mobilization is completed in a single turn. Since each of the first two Russian mobilizations must be completed before the next Russian mobilization occurs; Russia may never mobilize its first two mobilizations faster than one mobilization every two turns unless war breaks out between Russian and Germany.

E. BRITAIN: Fall 1939.
F. FRANCE: None.
G. U.S.: The U.S. mobilizes independently in each theater, as set out below. The effective tension level for each theater is determined at the end of the Allied diplomatic phase, immediately after a die roll is made to determine the effective tension level for that turn (49.851A, 49.852A):
H. CHINA: None.

36.21 BRP ADDITIONS: Each mobilization results in BRP increases to the mobilizing major power's BRP base and BRP level, as set out below. BRP additions from mobilization are not prorated.
A. ITALY, JAPAN, BRITAIN: 10 BRPs per mobilization.
B. U.S.: 25 BRPs per mobilization.
C. RUSSIA: Russia constructs an IC and adds the BRP value of the IC to its BRP level (37.62).

36.31 FORCE POOL INCREASES: Mobilization increases the force pool of the mobilizing major power. In the turn of mobilization, the mobilizing major power announces and records the types of units being mobilized and when they enter its force pool, then places the units in the appropriate location on the turn record track (EXCEPTIONS: Shipbuilding increases - 36.34; deferred force pool additions - 36.351). The size of force pool increases from mobilization is proportional to the mobilizing major power's growth rate:
A. JAPAN, RUSSIA, U.S.: 20 BRPs of units for each turn of mobilization (EXCEPTION: For its first two peacetime mobilizations, Russia adds 10 BRPs of units in the first turn of the mobilization and another 10 BRPs of units in the following turn).
B. BRITAIN: 16 BRPs of units for each turn of mobilization.
C. ITALY: 8 BRPs of units for each turn of mobilization.
36.32 ELIGIBLE UNITS: Force pool increases from mobilization, even if deferred and combined with production, can only be used to generate the following types of units:
A. Army air.
B. Naval air.
C. Armor:
D. Infantry.
E. Mechanized infantry. Britain may mobilize only one 3-4 infantry unit.
F. Transports. Transports may only be mobilized by the U.S, subject to the following restrictions:
36.33 PROHIBITED UNITS: The force pools of units other than those listed in 36.32, including submarines, ASW, strategic bombers, interceptors, air transports, specialized units, flak and partisans, may only be increased by the investment of RPs in production.
36.34 SHIPBUILDING: Subject to the restrictions in 36.341, a mobilizing major power may increase its shipbuilding rate rather than its ground or air force pools. Each shipbuilding rate increase is equivalent to five BRPs of units.
36.341 RESTRICTIONS: Shipyard mobilization is subject to the following restrictions:
A. Shipbuilding rates may not be increased more than once per turn, whether by mobilization or production (42.23E) (EXCEPTIONS: The U.S. may increase its shipbuilding rate in each theater in the same turn; once the U.S. is at war in a theater, including the turns in which war breaks out between the U.S. and Germany and the U.S. and Japan, the U.S. may increase its shipbuilding twice per turn in that theater, whether by mobilization or production. The same mobilization may not generate a second shipbuilding increase if a transport is generated as part of that mobilization).
B. American shipbuilding increases from mobilization must be assigned to the theater in which the mobilization occurs.
C. American shipbuilding increases from production in a theater are prohibited until the U.S. is at war in that theater or U.S. tensions in that theater have reached 50.
D. Italian and British mobilizations may not be used to increase shipbuilding.
E. The Japanese Fall 1939 mobilization may not be used to increase shipbuilding.
F. Deferred mobilizations may not be used to increase shipbuilding rates (36.351).
36.35 TIMING OF FORCE POOL INCREASES: Force pool increases from mobilization are subject to the following delays:
B. AIR: Four turns.
C. INFANTRY: Two turns.
E. ARMOR: Six turns.
36.351 DEFERRING FORCE POOL ADDITIONS: Mobilizations may not be postponed or declined, but Japan, Russia and the U.S. may defer up to five BRPs of force pool additions from mobilization. Deferred force pool additions from mobilization may be triggered on any of the four turns following the deferment. Force pool additions which are not triggered within this time are lost. The delay for deferred force pool additions is determined from the turn in which the force pool addition is announced. Force pool additions generated partly from mobilization and partly from production are subject to the delay associated with mobilization.

This allows a major power to combine a portion of a mobilization with a subsequent mobilization or production so as to add units to its force pool which would otherwise be too costly to mobilize or produce. It also allows a neutral major power to avoid having its BRP base growth diminished in a YSS due to unbuilt units.

EXAMPLE: In Fall 1939, Japan mobilizes 3 AAF, 6 NAS and defers 5 BRPs of force pool additions from its mobilization. In Spring 1940, Japan uses the deferred mobilization to generate 5 more NAS. In Fall 1940, the 3 AAF and 6 NAS mobilized in Fall 1939 are added to the Japanese force pool. With Japan's naval air training rate of 3, all of the 6 NAS added to the Japanese force pool may be built before the 1941 YSS and there is no decrease in the number of unspent BRPs used to determine Japan's BRP base growth (35.32).
36.352 RESTRICTIONS: Britain and Italy may not defer force pool additions.
36.353 DELAYING FORCE POOL ADDITIONS: A major power may not voluntarily delay force pool additions from mobilization.

36.41 MOBILIZATION STAGGERED: Each major power may mobilize only once per turn, subject to the following exceptions:
A. RUSSIA: Russia’s first two mobilizations take two turns to complete unless they occur after war has broken out between Germany and Russia. Russia must complete its final peacetime mobilization before starting its wartime mobilizations - if a Russian peacetime mobilization is partially completed when war breaks out between Germany and Russia, the second half of the mobilization must be completed before the next, one-turn Russian mobilization occurs (36.11D).
EXAMPLES: RGT reach 10 in Fall 1940 and Russia mobilizes. This mobilization is competed in Winter 1940. The second Russian mobilization occurs in Spring 1941, and is completed in Summer 1941, even if Germany attacks Russia in Summer 1941.
If RGT reached 10 only in Winter 1940, Russia’s first mobilization would occur in Winter 1940, and could complete in Spring 1941. If Germany attacked Russia in Summer 1941, Russia’s second mobilization would occur after the outbreak of war and would take only one turn. Russia would then mobilize again in Fall 1941, Winter 1941 and Spring 1942.

B. U.S.: American mobilization in one theater does not affect American mobilization in the other theater.